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The Sui Generis Infallible Sniffing Dog And Other Legal Fictions:
Illinois v. Caballes
By Jerry E. Norton*
Every frequent reader of judicial opinions
has had the experience. Reading an opinion,
one is struck by the unreality of the discourse. It
is as though Doctor Pangloss, Voltaire's charac-
ter from his tale Candide, is writing his decla-
mation "all is for the best in the best of all pos-
sible worlds." Contrary evidence, although
present, is categorically rejected.
Reading the Supreme Court's decision in
Illinois v Caballes, released January 24, 2005,
provokes just such a Pangloss comparison. In
Caballes, a majority of the Court reaffirmed its
conclusion that an intrusive investigative tech-
nique is not a "search" and is therefore outside
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court based its conclusion solely on its faith that
the technique exposes only contraband, never
innocent private information. The Court refused
to consider evidence that the technique is in fact
flawed. It refused to consider the evidence
because 20 years earlier it concluded without
either evidence or argument that the technique
was reliable.
"A canine sniff by a
R o y detection dog is 'sui genert
Cabafles'
journey to presence or absence of n
the United
States
Supreme
Court began on Interstate 80 in LaSalle County,
Illinois, in November 1998.2 An Illinois State
Police Trooper stopped Caballes for driving six
miles over the posted 65 miles per hour speed
limit. The trooper requested of the dispatcher a
confirmation of Caballes' driver's license and
information on his prior criminal record. The
dispatcher reported that Caballes had two prior
arrests for marijuana distribution. The trooper
asked Caballes for permission to search the
trunk of his car, which Caballes refused. A sec-
we
s'b
rco
ond Illinois State Trooper, assigned to the
Illinois State Police Drug Interdiction Team,
overheard these radio transmissions and told
the dispatcher that he was going to the scene of
the stop to conduct a canine sniff.
Meanwhile, the stopping officer conclud-
ed that he had no basis for further investigation,
so he started writing a warning ticket. However,
he permitted himself to be distracted by a radio
call on an unrelated matter, so that he was still
writing the ticket when the canine unit arrived.
The officer walked a drug-detection dog around
Caballes' car, and the dog "alerted" at the car
trunk. The stopping officer opened and
searched the car trunk, finding marijuana.
Caballes was charged with cannabis trafficking.
He moved to suppress the cannabis found in
the trunk of his car, but his motion was denied.
The appellate court affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed,3
holding that marijuana found in the trunk of
Caballes' car was obtained in violation of the
Fourth
li-trained narcotics- Amendment
ecause it 'discloses only the as applied
tics, a contraband item. iby theU n i t e d
StatesJustice John Paul Stevens S u p r e m e
Court in
Tery v Ohio.4 In reaching the conclusion that
the search exceeded that allowed in Terry, the
Illinois Court relied on a principle it had more
fully explored in its 2002 decision in People v.
Cox.5 As restated in Caballes, the principle is
that, in assessing the reasonableness of a stop,
not only the justification at its inception must be
considered, but also the court should consider
"(2) 'whether it was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interfer-
ence in the first place.' "6 Of its ruling in Cox,
Dog, continued on page 12
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Dog, continued from page 11
the Illinois court said, "We emphasized that the
sniff was impermissible without 'specific and
articulable facts' to support the stopping officer's
request for the canine unit."7 While the stop-
ping officer in Caballes did not request the
canine unit as in Cox, the Illinois Supreme Court
believed that "the overall effect remains the
same. As in Cox, the police impermissibly
broadened the scope of the traffic stop in this
case into a drug investigation . . ."8 Thus the
Illinois Supreme Court ruled that whenever a
minimally intrusive highway stop is expanded
into a full drug-sniffing dog investigation, there
must be some reasonable basis for that expan-
sion.
The United States Supreme Court
reversed the decision of
the Illinois Supreme Court.
Speaking for the majority
of the Court in a very brief
opinion, Justice Stevens
ignored the Terry basis for
the Illinois Court decision.
It relied instead on a 1983
Supreme Court decision,
United States v. Place,
holding that a dog sniff is
not a search and therefore
not subject to the Fourth
Amendment.9 "In [Place] .
we treated a canine sniff
by a well-trained narcotics-
detection dog as 'sui
generis' because it 'dis-
closes only the presence
or absence of narcotics, a
contraband item.' "10
"Accordingly, the use of a well-trained narcotics-
detection dog - one that 'does not expose non-
contraband items that otherwise would remain
hidden from public view,' . . . during a lawful traf-
fic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate
privacy interests."), Efforts by the Respondent
to argue the unreliability of dog sniffs were sum-
marily turned away. "[T]he record contains no
evidence or findings that support his argu-
ment."12 The majority agreed with the Illinois
Supreme Court's Cox decision in one regard. "A
seizure that is justified solely by the interest in
issuing a warning ticket to the driver can
become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to complete that mis-
sion."3 Time, however, seemed to be the only
factor Justice Stevens would consider.
At this point the Caballes decision may
simply be explained as a reaffirmation of a 20-
year-old precedent. But that precedent, United
States v. Place, is itself a questionable decision.
In Place, a narcotics dog sniffed luggage at
Kennedy Airport. The Supreme Court held,
however, that the evidence should have been
suppressed The ruling of the Supreme Court
was that the retention of the
luggage for more than 90
minutes exceeded that per-
missible in a Terry stop.14
Thus, the Court found that it
exceeded the scope of
Terry, the point that the
Illinois Supreme Court used
in deciding Caballes!
However, the majori-
ty in Place went on to rule
that a canine sniff is not a
"search."15 Since the issue
in Place was the detention
of the luggage for 90 min-
utes, the question of the
dog sniff being a search for
Fourth Amendment purpos-
es was purely dictum. As
Justice Blackmun said in his
concurrence, "The Court
has no need to decide the issue here."16 Justice
Brennan agreed and added that the dog sniff
issue was neither briefed nor argued before the
Court in Place. 7
Thus, without either brief or argument,
the Court concluded in 1983 and reaffirmed
without reexamination in 2005 that "a canine
sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog is
'sui generis' because it 'discloses only the pres-
Dog, continued on page 13
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Dog, continued from page 12
ence or absence of narcotics, a contraband
item.' "18 The Respondent in Caballes tried to
challenge the conclusion that dog sniffs are as
reliable as the majority seems to assume. If
these dogs are not particularly reliable, the
"alerts" may be caused by private sources other
than contraband. Dissenting in Caballes,
Justice Souter said, "What we have learned
about the fallibility of dogs in the years since
Place was decided would itself be rea-
son to call for reconsidering Place's
decision against treating the intention- "Wha
al use of a trained dog as a search."19 learnec
After a review of cases, he concludes fallibil
"The infallible dog . . . is a creature of
legal fiction."2o He argues that, if the in the y
Court is to be consistent in saying that Place
a dog sniff is not a search, then the
Fourth Amendment will have nothing edwou
to do with the police use of them. reason
Police dogs could be indiscriminately recon
used to sweep cars on the street, in
parking lots or stopped at traffic lights Place'
and even pedestrians on sidewalks. again
Justice Souter also joined in a the in
separate dissent written by Justice
Ginsburg. In this dissent, Justice Of
Ginsburg returned to the argument dog as
raised by the Illinois Court. The ques-
tion isn't only whether or not a dog Justice
sniff is a search, but also whether sub-
jecting a motorist to these dogs impermissibly
broadens the scope of the traffic stop under
Terry v. Ohio. And in assessing the scope of the
stop, time is not the only issue. "In applying
Terry, the Court has several times indicated that
the limitation on 'scope' is not confined to the
duration of the seizure; it also encompasses the
manner in which the seizure is conducted"21
She agreed with the Illinois Supreme Court that
the use of dogs might fail the second Terry
inquiry. "Even if the drug sniff is not character-
ized as a Fourth Amendment 'search' . . ., the
sniff surely broadened the scope of the traffic-
violation-related seizure."22 "Under today's
decision, every traffic stop could become an
occasion to call in the dogs, to the distress and
embarrassment of the law-abiding population."23
As in Voltaire's Candide, the majority of
the Court apparently accepts the belief that
police dogs will detect contraband, and only
contraband, as an article of faith, as Pangloss
accepted his fate in "the best of all possible
worlds." As Pangloss might have put it, "A sniff-
ing dog is reliable because the Court would not
have said it is if it were not true. Evidence is
pie t
t we have persc
d about the Ous
than
ity of dogs in a
ears since eithe
was decid-
wasld itself be the p
to call for priso
sidering not d
s decision theythed
st treating inter
tentional shoul
a trained theysettin
a search." nity.
digni
)avid Souter scien
A ma
cessary."24 Surely subjecting peo-
) the degradation of having their
ns and property targeted for obvi-
public humiliation deserves more
just an uncritical citation to dictum
n earlier case, unsupported by
r briefs or arguments.
The uninvited attention of dogs
obviously degrading and cruel in
hotographs we saw of Abu Ghraib
n. Narcotic-detection dogs are
egrading to the same degree, but
are not such minimal intrusions on
ignity and the legitimate privacy
3sts of the individual that we
ld simply ignore the possibility that
are not reliable enough in every
g to justify the cost in human dig-
At least, the potential issues of
ty and privacy merit a more con-
tious review of the Fourth
idment issues than the Supreme
Court gave us in Illinois v. Caballes or United
States v. Place.
* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago.
1. Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005).
2. This factual background is drawn from the decision of
the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Caballes, 207 Ill.
2d 504, 802 N.E.2d 202 (2003).
3. Id.
4. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5. People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 782 N.E.2d 275 (2002).
6. People v. Caballes, supra n.2, 207 Ill. 2d at 508, N.E.2d
at 204.
7. Id. at 509
8. Id. at 510; Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 472. In both the Cox and
the Caballes cases, Justice Thomas filed dissenting opin-
ions in which he spoke for three of the seven Illinois
Dog, continued on page 14
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Supreme Court members.
9. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
10. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 838.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109
(1984).
14. Place, 462 U.S. at 709-710.
15. Id. at 707.
16. Id. at 723 (Blackmun, H. concurring).
17. Id. at 710 (Brennan, J. concurring).
18. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 838.
19. Id. at 839. (Souter, D. dissenting).
2 0. Id.
21. Id. (Ginsburg, R. dissenting).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. "Well, my dear Pangloss," said Candide to him,
"when you were hanged, dissected, severely beaten, and
tugging at the oar in the galley, did you always think that
things in this world were for the best?"
"I am still of my first opinion," answered Pangloss; "for
as I am a philosopher, it would be inconsistent with my
character to contradict myself; . . ..
Voltaire, Candide, Chapter XXVIll.
The Debate Over Consumer Arbitration Clauses
By Emily Rozwadowski
Predispute arbitration clauses are often
used by businesses in contracts with other
businesses. These clauses require the parties
to settle disputes in arbitration rather than in
court. However, these clauses are now being
added by businesses into their contracts with
consumers. These clauses also require con-
sumers to settle disputes in arbitration. In addi-
tion, the clauses often preclude consumers
from bringing class action lawsuits.
Proponents of arbitration say there are
many advantages to the system. Arbitrations
are kept confidential, are governed by a nation-
al set of procedures, and require limited dis-
covery. Proponents argue that predispute arbi-
tration clauses are not necessarily unfair to
consumers. Arbitration lowers a business's
costs and these costs will be passed on to
other consumers.
The use of arbitration clauses in con-
sumer contracts, however, is controversial.
Opponents of arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts say that the high cost of arbitration
may prevent consumers from seeking redress.
In addition, many clauses preclude class action
suits, which opponents say is harmful to con-
surmers.
"In general, I believe mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses are unfair," said Jean Sternlight,
Saltman Professor, University of Nevada-Las
Vegas, Boyd School of Law, and director,
Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution.
"People haven't entered into them in a know-
ing, voluntary, and intelligent way."
Sternlight argues that arbitration claus-
es are harmful to consumers because they are
imposed on consumers without the con-
sumers' consent. "Because of the way the
clauses are imposed, companies can con-
struct them in a way that is beneficial to them,"
Sternlight said.
Professor Mark Budnitz, a law profes-
sor at Georgia State University College of
Law, also believes arbitration clauses in con-
sumer contracts are unfair because arbitrators
are not required to follow consumer protection
laws, there is no jury trial, and there is no way
for the consumer to appeal the award. Budnitz
also believes the clauses are unfair because
arbitration proceedings are kept private.
"Companies can hide their misdeeds
because arbitration proceedings are secret,"
Arbitration, continued on page 15
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